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THE SCOPE OF HABEAS CORPUS INQUIRY IN
FUGITIVE EXTRADITION CASES
In Sweeney v. Woodall,1 the petitioner, a Negro, had escaped from imprison-
ment in Alabama and made his way to Ohio, where he was apprehended by
Ohio officials pursuant to a request for rendition by the Governor of Alabama.2
The Ohio executive ordered his return to Alabama,3 whereupon Woodall ap-
plied to the Ohio courts for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that while confined
in Alabama he had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fugitive offered to prove that his
Alabama jailors had frequently beaten him with a nine pound strap with
metal prongs, resulting in unconsciousness and permanent wounds; that he
had been stripped to the waist and made to work all day in the broiling sun
without a rest period; and that he had been forced to be a "gal-boy" or
female for the homosexuals among the prisoners. Woodall contended that he
would be treated even more inhumanely if returned.4
Having exhausted his remedies in the courts of Ohio without relief,5 Woodall
renewed his petition in the federal courts.6 The District Court dismissed the
petition but the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded
the ease for a hearing upon the merits.7  The Supreme Court in turn reversed
the Court of Appeals, holding that if the prisoner had not escaped he would
have had to bring his action in Alabama;8 that by escaping to "another
jurisdiction he should not be allowed to affect the authority of the Alabama
1. 344 U.S. 86 (1952).
2. "A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, shall on
demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be deliVered up to be
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime." Article Four, section two, of the
United States Constitution. The procedure to be followed has been set out by Congress
in 18 U.S.C. §3281 (1948). The papers required in a request for rendition must contain a
demand for the fugitive, a copy of the indictment or an affidavit charging the fugitive with a
crime, and authentication by the Governor or Chief Magistrate of the demanding state.
See 2 Moore, ExTRADonox, §632 (1891).
3. If the asylum state refuses to comply with the request there is no remedy available
to the demanding state. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861). Thus it has been
called a moral duty only.
4. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 88 (1952). Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent
says that, "lurid details are offered in support of this main charge."
5. In re Woodall, 88 Ohio App. 202, 89 N.E.2d 493 (1949).
6. The power of a federal court to grant a writ is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §2241 (1948),
which states that a writ "shall not extend to a prisoner unless-1.) He is in custody under
or by color of authority of the United States, or, . . . 3.) He is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or treaties of the United States . . ." See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241
(1886).
7. 194 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1952).
8. "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant
has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. . ..." 28 U.S.C. §2254 (1948).
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courts to determine the validity of his imprisonment";9 that our federal sys-
tem requires the prisoner to test the claimed unconstitutionality of his treat-
ment by Alabama in the courts of that state ;LO and that in Alabama all parties
may be heard and all pertinent testimony will be readily available." Woodall
therefore must return to the cruel treatment he fears (assuming his allegations
are true) in order to have his case heard upon its merits.
The problem of a fugitive's right to raise questions of cruel and unusual
punishment, in habeas corpus proceedings, first arose in Johnson v. Dye,12 a
ease involving facts substantially similar to the Sweeney case. There the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the petitioner need not have
exhausted his remedies in the courts of the asylum state in order to apply to
the federal courts ;13 that cruel and unusual punishment by a state is pro-
hibited by the Fourteenth Amendment ;14 and that an inquiry into the truth
of such assertions is permissible in a habeas corpus petition while the fugitive
is still in asylum.'15 The Dye case was reversed by the Supreme Court16 in a
one sentence per curiam opinion citing Ex parte Hawk.17 This ambiguous
reversal left in doubt whether the Supreme Court meant that the prisoner
must exhaust his remedies in the courts of the asylum state or the demanding
state before a hearing upon the merits of the claim would be considered by the
federal courts. As a result of this ambiguity the circuits became divided as to
just what the rule was. Several circuits held that an inquiry into the actions
of the demanding state was proper in such a petition.'18 Other circuits ruled
that the writ tested only the detention by the asylum state, and that any issues
regarding the actions of the demanding state must be heard there. 19 Not
9. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 89 (1952).
10. Id. p. 90.
11. Id. p. 90.
12. 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1950), rezd, 338 U.S. 864 (1950). Johnson, a convicted
murderer, escaped from prison in Georgia and fled to Pennsylvania where he was arrested
and ordered returned to Georgia pursuant to interstate rendition procedure. In petitioning
the Pennsylvania and ultimately the federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus, Johnson
alleged that he had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by the State of
Georgia in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
13. The court noted a conflict existing among the circuits as to the applicability of 28
U.S.C. §2254, requiring exhaustion of state remedies, and decided that the petitioner need
not have .exhausted his remedies in the Pennsylvania courts. United States ex rel. Darcy v.
Superintendent of County Prison, 111 F.2d 409, 411 (3d Cir. 1940), cert. den., 311 U.S. 662
(1940). McCline v. Myering, 75 F.2d 716, 718 (7th Cir. 1934). Contra: Lyon v. Harkness,
151 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. den. 327 U.S. 782 (1946). Kauffman v. Mount, 131 F.2d
1112 (5th Cir. 1942). See 25 NoRE DAME LAW 153 (1949).
14. The Supreme Court has not yet definitively ruled on the issue of whether cruel and
unusual punishment is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the court went so far as to assume that in-
fliction of cruel and unusual punishment by a state would violate the due process clause.
Protection against such punishment would seem to be a part of the "very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty" which Mr. justice Cardozo declared was the test in deciding
which rights fall within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See 36 CORNELL L. Q. 362 (1951), and 2 STAN. L. REV. 174 (1949).
15. Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1950).
16. 338 U.S. 864 (1950).
17. In Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116 (1944). the court stated that, "habeas corpus
by one detained under a state court judgment of conviction for a crime will be entertained
by a federal court only after all state remedies available ... have been exhausted. .. ."
18. Sweeney v. Woodall, 194 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1952). United States ex rel. Jackson v.
Ruthazer, 181 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1950). Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1950).
19. Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951). Davis v. O'Connell, 185 F.2d 513
(8th Cir. 1950). Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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until Sweeney v. Woodall20 did the Supreme Court directly meet the issue
and apparently adopt the latter view.
The scope of inquiry in habeas corpus cases dealing with interstate rendition
has been strictly limited in the past and the courts generally have confined
themselves to the following factors: (a) the identity of the fugitive ;21 (b)
whether the prisoner is a fugitive from justice;22 and (c) whether the ac-
cused was in the demanding state at the time the alleged crime was com-
mitted.23 If the fugitive were permitted to test the validity of his original
incarceration this traditional scope of review would either be broadened or
an exception raised to include allegations of cruel and unusual punishment.
The Sweeney case decided in favor of the narrower approach by requiring the
prisoner to test his claim in the courts of the demanding state.
The Sweeney case represents a reluctance on the part of the courts to enlarge
the traditional scope of review on the grounds that the writ tests only the
detention by the asylum state,2 4 although not till Johnson v. Matthews 25 was
there a case specifically denying substantive review where allegations of cruel
and unusual punishment were made. Exceptions to this limited review have
been made in the past. In Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v. Superintendent
of County Prison,26 a state court granted the petitioner's release when it
appeared that he would face the danger of lynching if returned to the de-
manding state. The tendency of the state and lower federal courts to inquire
more fully into claimed constitutional abuses27 reflects a growing dissatisfaction
with the traditional scope of review.
28
Many reasons have been advanced for following the view of the Sweeney
case in retaining the traditional scope of review in habeas corpus proceedings.
But assuming that the allegations of cruel and unusual punishment are true,
it seems clear that any reasons advanced for requiring a man to return to
imprisonment, which is known to be barbaric and cruel and which will endan-
ger his life, must be of the most convincing nature.
In support of its stand, the Supreme Court places a great deal of emphasis
upon the relations between the federal and state governments, stating that,
"considerations fundamental to our federal system require that the prisoner
20. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952).
21. In re White, 55 Fed. 54 (2d Cir. 1893).
22. Bruce v. Rayner, 124 Fed. 481 (4th Cir. 1903).
23. Id. p. 141. See Scott and Roe, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS, 390 (1923), 46 Cornell
L.Q. 362 (1951), 47 Col. L.R. 470 (1947). Certain factors such as the guilt or innocence of
the accused, alibis and the sufficiency of the indictment will not be considered. Hyatt v.
Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903). See 2 Moore, ExTRADrroN, §632 (1891).
24. Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1 (1909). In Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677
(D.C. Cir. 1950), the court disagreed with the Dye case and held that the review tests
only the actions and detention of the asylum state.
25. 182 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1950). The court held that the writ tested only the deten-
tion by the asylum state and not that of the demanding state. The scope of permissible
review has been established by the Supreme Court. Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1 (1909).
Ex parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642 (1885).
26. 152 Pa. Super. 167, 31 A.2d 576 (1943). The court said, "where there is sufficient
competent evidence to sustain a charge that the accused relator will be unable to have a
fair trial and will be in grave danger of being lynched if returned . . . the judge hearing
the writ . . ." may refuse to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. Id. at p. 173.
27. Several courts have held that the scope of review includes allegations of constitutional
abuses. Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v. Superintendent of County Prison, 152 Pa. Super.
167, 31 A.2d 576 (1943), Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1950), Sweeney v. Woodall,
194 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1952), United States ex rel. Jackson v. Ruthazer, 181 F.2d 588 (2d
Cir. 1950).
28. See 47 Col. L.Rev. 470 (1947).
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test the claimed unconstitutionality of his treatment by Alabama in the
courts of that state."29 This view follows the rule of comity which holds that
one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction, "until
the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cogni-
zant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.' '30
However, the "flexible nature" of the writ of habeas corpus will allow a
waiver of this rule "when necessary to prevent an unjust and illegal depriva-
tion of human liberty." 31 Viewing cruel and unusual punishment as a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, it can be fairly argued that requiring a
man to return to such treatment in order to obtain relief would qualify him
for this waiver.32 If such a waiver were to be allowed the possibility of ill
will between the respective sovereignties, which is the basis of many rules of
comity, would be.no greater than when the constitutionality of any state action
is passed upon in the federal courts. Moreover, the rare number of these
cases leads to the conclusion that this danger is more apparent than real.33
A second argument in support of the Sweeney rule is that to permit the
fugitive to test the validity of his original incarceration in the asylum state
would place a premium on and encourage escaping to another jurisdiction,
34
for if Woodall had not escaped he would have had to exhaust his remedies in
the Alabama courts before making an application to the federal courts sitting
in Alabama.35 As has elsewhere been pointed out, there is little validity to
the argument.3 6 Prisoners do not escape with the idea of being recaptured and
resisting their return to prison, for in the event of recapture, the escapee
would likely be subjected to an additional prison term. In addition, the fugi-
tive bears the burden of proof as to the truth of his allegations.3 7 Because
of the reluctance of the courts to release an obviously guilty man, this proof
must be of the most convincing nature. Thus, the difficulty in proving alle-
gations of cruel and unusual punishment might itself be a healthy detterent
if the escape argument has any validity.
Another reason advanced for the decision in the Sweeney case is that the
demanding state can better and more readily defend against its claimed con-
stitutional abuses in the courts of that state.38 But, whenever a fugitive con-
tests his rendition the demanding state assumes a certain burden to aid in
overcoming the prisoner's allegations. It does not appear that this burden
would be sufficiently increased, when allegations of cruel and unusual punish-
ment are made, to warrant sending the prisoner back to the brutal treatment
he alleges. Moreover, the relatively small number of these cases and the
present status of modern communications and transportation greatly detract
from this argument.
While the reasons in support of the Sweeney decision do not appear to be
of the most convincing nature, the decision of the court nevertheless requires
29. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 90 (1952).
30. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950). See Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d 308
(9th Cir. 1951)-a chse involving the same basic problem as the Sweeney and Dye Cases.
31. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 681 (194-7). Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 283 (1947).
32. See note 14, supra.
33. See 64 Har. L. Rev. 271 (1950), where it is pointed out that in the first part of
1950, only six such cases were reproted. t
34. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 89 (1952). The court said that the prisoner could
not change his position by a form of 'self-help" in escaping from prison.
35. 28 U.S.C. 2254 (1948). Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944). See note 8, supra.
36. Horowitz and Steinberg, 23 So. Calif. L.Rev. 441 (1950).
37. Ibid.
38. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 89 (1952).
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the fugitive to return to the demanding state where it is assumed he will be
able to obtain adequate relief.39 The next question then is whether that relief
is available. The Sweeney case indicates the prisoner may renew his suit for
habeas corpus in the courts of the demanding state, and if relief is not ac-
corded him there he may apply to the federal courts after exhausting his
state remedies. 40 There are several factors that tend to make this remedy
unattractive. While this time consuming litigation proceeds, the prisoner
(assuming his allegations are true) may be subjected to more of the punish-
ment which he alleges to be illegal, -while facing the added danger of retalia-
tion. The possibility of speedy relief in the state courts would appear remote
since punishment of extreme degrees is often provided by state statutes that
have been upheld by the state courts as constitutional.4 1 The retaliatory and
racial prejudices that may exist in the demanding state courts could also pre-
vent quick relief from the "cruel" punishment.
Should state courts fail to provide relief to the prisoner, the federal courts
are severely limited as to the type of remedies available in a habeas corpus
proceeding. While the usual remedy in habeas corpus is the release of the
prisoner,42 courts are hesitant to grant such relief because an obviously guilty
man would be turned loose upon society. Injunctive remedies do not appear
to be obtainable in the federal courts. The circuits are in conflict as to whether
a federal prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus may be remanded to the
federal prison with instructions for the protection of his Constitutional
rights. 43  This reluctance to enjoin federal prison officials leaves only a slight
possibility that such an order would issue from a federal court to a state
official."
However, if no remedy other than release should prove to be available, the
problem becomes one of balancing conflicting public interests: i.e., the right
of a state to demand that a criminal pay for his crime, as opposed to the pro-
tection of those basic rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Just
as it is felt that the gathering of illegal evidence is best discouraged by making
it inadmissible and its use the cause for reversal, even though the accused is
proven guilty by other evidence,4 5 such releases might reasonably be justified
as a means of protecting a prisoner's civil rights, and encouraging prison
reform.
46
Remedies other than habeas corpus might be available to the returned pri-
soner. A tort action against the responsible state officials is the principal form
of legal redress, but this action affords no quick relief from the existing punish-
ment and frequently state statutes prevent a prisoner from suing while im-
prisoned.47 As a result evidence and testimony grow cold and prisoners are
forced to look to the federal courts. A prisoner may choose to bring an action
39. Id. p. 89.
40. Id. p. 89.
41. See Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F.Supp. 943 (S.D. Calif. 1950), rev'd, 188 F.2d
308 (9th Cir. 1951), where this issue is discuseed in the District Court's opinion.
42. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1952).
43. In Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1952), the court that habeas corpus was
not limited to a mere release or remand. However in Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32
(8th Cir. 1952), the court said, "the function of habeas corpus is not to correct a practise,
but only to ascertain whether the procedure complained of has resulted in an unlawful
detention."
44. See 59 Yale L.J. 800 (1950), and United States v. Jones, 108 F.Supp. 266 (D.C. Fla.
1953).
45. Malenski v. New York. 324 U.S. 401 (1944). Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1943).
46. See, Sutherland, DuE PROCESS AND CRUEL PUNISHMENT, 64 Har. L. Rev. 271 (1950).
47. See 26 Geo. L. J. 105 (1938).
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for injunctive relief under the federal Civil Rights Act.48 While in such an
action the prisoner need not first exhaust his state remedies, the courts might
hesitate to grant injunctive relief, as a result of a fear that the threat of con-
tempt proceedings would hamper prison administration.49 Because of the dif-
ficulty in proving an intent to deprive the prisoner of his constitutional rights,
relief through money damages is also severely limited.50 The only other relief
for the prisoner is the possibility of active federal prosecutions under the Civil
Rights Act or state legislation to reform the prison system-both of which ap-
pear very remote. 51
Thus it would seem that the prisoner has no adequate remedy in the demand-
ing state to correct alleged abuses of his constitutional rights. Habeas corpus
appears to be the most practical course, but the disadvantages of such an ac-
tion remain unremedied.
The Supreme Court may not have entirely set aside the decision of the
Third Circuit in the Dye ease. The concurring opinion of Justice Frank-
further adds emphasis to a point brought out by the majority: It was urged
that the fugitive had made no suggestion in his application that he would
be without opportunity to resort to the courts of Alabama for protection upon
his return.5 2 This would appear to leave open the possibility that if Woodall
had alleged in his application that he would be without such opportunity to
resort to the state courts for protection, the Supreme Court would have heard
the merits of the case.53 It could then be argued that this constitutional pro-
tection would extend to future punishment so severe (upon his return) as to
hinder or place an extremely high price on the prisoner's resort to the courts.
Such a view is in accord with the dissent in the Dye case, which said that relief
should only be granted where prospective mistreatment is alleged that would
allow an application to the demanding state courts only at the risk of death
or severe bodily harm.54 Ross v. Middlebrooks,55 and other cases5" recognized
the need for a different rule from that of the Sweeney case where there is
danger of future mistreatment or unavailability of state remedies.
More than mere allegations of future cruel and unusual punishment will be
required in order to obtain a hearing upon the merits, since Woodall had
alleged that much. Perhaps there must be an interrelation between the allega-
tions of future cruel punishment and the resulting unavailability of the courts.
But any future action will surely fail unless it is alleged that the courts of
the demanding state are only open at the price of great bodily harm.
48. 18 U.S.C. §242 (1948), allows a person to bring an action against any person who
willfully under color of state law, deprives him of his constitutional rights.
49. Thorp v. Clark, 67 F.Supp. 703, 709 (D.C.N.H. 1946). United States v. Jones, 108
F.Supp. 266 (D.C. Fla. 1953).
50. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
51. Federal relief is hampered by the same factors that make it extremely difficult for
an individual complainant to secure relief.
52. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 89, 90 (1952).
53. Mr. Justice Frankfurter cites Cochran v. State of Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942), where
the court held that a suppression of appeal documents by prison officials would be a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
54. Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3rd Cir. 1950);
55. 188 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951). The court stated that requiring the prisoner to return
to the demanding state to present his allegations, "is not aggravated in this case by an
allegation or showing of probable mistreatment en route or other special circumstances
. ." which would allow the court to ignore a rule of comity.
56. Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 69 (1909). See dissent in Johnson v. Matthews,
182 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1950), and the dissent in Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3rd Cir.
1950).
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